President Kennedy then met with both Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns and Sukarno, both of whom had accepted a United Nations trust but disagreed on the details. When the United States supported a “compromise” resolution at the United Nations that rejected Indonesia, relations with Indonesia were bored. In December, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy Kennedy strongly advised a pro-Indonesian stance for the “Soviet bloc to… Indonesia is getting even closer to it.  The secret talks negotiated by the United States at the ambassadorial level began in March 1962 without preconditions, but Sukarno was skeptical of American intentions.  The interviews took place at Huntland`s property in Middleburg, Virginia.  A draft plan by US diplomat Ellsworth Bunker in 1962 provided that the Netherlands would transfer control of New Guinea to neutral United Nations administrators, who would be gradually replaced by Indonesian administrators, and then to Indonesia, which would hold a referendum “to give freedom to the Papuans” with the UN Secretary General and other UNITED Nations staff.  The Netherlands responded that the proposal was a “shocking betrayal of the United States” which initially wanted to hold the referendum under the ADMINISTRATION of the United Nations, although the United States, after threatening to make the negotiations public, acceded to the agreement with the addition of a “right to self-determination”.  Secretary of State Subandrio, who considered the UN monitoring and holding of the referendum as a “humiliation for Indonesia”, only accepted a set of lean guidelines for the referendum when the United States threatened to “change sides and support the Dutch”.  The final version of the agreement provided for the following parameters for the act of free choice: 2. With regard to the raising of the Indonesian and Dutch flags, it was agreed that this issue would be resolved by mutual agreement between the Secretary-General and the respective governments.
The agreement was put on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 and froze General Assembly Resolution 1752 (XVII), which gave the United Nations the power to occupy and administer West Guinea. Although the agreements were not in a position to deny the commitments set out in the Charter of the United Nations and the agreement claimed that it was for the good of the inhabitants of the territory, some believed that the agreement sacrificed the inhabitants of the territory for the good of the foreign powers. In a 1962 summary of the U.S. FOREIGN MINISTER`S it states that “the agreement was almost a total victory for Indonesia and a defeat for the Netherlands”, that the United States “Bureau of European Affairs” sympathized with the Dutch view that Indonesia`s annexation would simply act against brown colonialism,” and that “the underlying reason that the Kennedy administration pushed the Netherlands to accept this agreement , it was that she believed that the idea of preventing Indonesia from the Cold War, the communist overlapped with the Dutch affair. This agreement prevails over all previous agreements in this area.